56--5.2.2 区域经济一体化

5.

2.2Regional economic integrationP2In recentyears,the integrationof regionaleconomy hasstarted anupsurge/Aps3d3/in thewhole world,with thecharacteristics ofvarioustypes ofintegration,while DohaRound hasnot deliveredthe results.Nations turn to regionalismto achievetheir tradeambition.P3as thefigures shown,China hassigned14agreements and some areundernegotiation Themost influentialone is the onebelt andone roadoinitiative.P4The UnitedStates startedTPP andTTIP,even afterMR.Trump quit fromthe negotiations,he stillenhances thelevel ofNAFTA andproposes anarrangementwith Japan.At thesame time,Japan continuesTPPnegotiation andTPP willtake intoeffect inDecember30,

2018.P5EU isenlarging tothe eastin lastdecades whilethe U.K.quitfromit.It isbreakingnews tothe world.Economic cooperationamong differentregionsbecomes thefocus of the globaleconomy.P6In thischapter,we examineeconomic integrationin generaland customsunionsin particular.The theory of economicintegration refersto thecommercialpolicy ofdiscriminatively reducingor eliminatingtrade barriersonly among the nations joiningtogether.The degreeof economicintegrationranees frompreferential tradearrangements tofree tradeareas.customs unions,common markets,and economicunion.Preferential tradearrangementsprovide lowerbarriers on trade amongparticipatingnations thanon tradewith nonmember nations.This istheloosest formof economicintegration.The bestexample of a preferentialtradearrangement isthe BritishCommonwealth PreferenceScheme,established in1932by the United Kingdomwith membersandsomeformermembers of the BritishEmpire.A free trade areaisthe formof economicintegration wherein all barriersareremoved ontrade among members,but eachnation retainsits ownbarriersto tradewith nonmembers.The NorthAmerican FreeTradeAgreement NAFTAformed bytheUnitedStates,Canada,and Mexicoin

1993.China andSouth Koreareached freetrade agreementin

2012.A customs unionallows notariffs orother barriersontradeamongmembers asinafreetrade area,and inaddition itharmonizes tradepoliciessuch asthe settingof commontariff ratestoward the rest of theworld.A common marketgoes beyonda customs union byalso allowingthe freemovementof laborand capitalamongmembernations.The EUachievedthe statusof acommonmarketat thebeginning of

1993.An economicuniongoes stillfurther byharmonizing oreven unifyingthemonetary andfiscal policiesof memberstates.This isthe mostadvancedtype ofeconomicintegration.An exampleis Benelux,which istheeconomic unionof Belgium,the Netherlands,and Luxembourg,formed（）after WorldWar IIand nowpart ofthe EU.P7So wedraw aconclusion about the featuresof regional arrangements inatable.We find,from freetradeareato economicunion,the integrateddegreeof regionalarrangements aredeepeningP8From commodityfree flowto harmonizationof alleconomic policies,anation needsto giveaway morepolicy-making powerto（）（）supranational/su:pralnaej3n3l;sju:-/body.Firstly justconcedes tariff,/znext tariff-making policy,and thendomestic policyconcerning factormovement,last fiscaland monetarypolicy-making power.It isnecessary fora nationto weighthe gainand lossfrom theregionalarrangements.We willdiscuss further.P9Because regionalarrangements flourishnow,we needto analyzethewelfare effect of aregionalarrangement.We willtake tariffunion asexampleand illustratefrom staticeffects anddynamic effects.PIOThe static,partial equilibriumeffects offorming a customs union aremeasured interms of trade creation and trade diversion.What eretrade大国崛起之德国篇关creation andtrade diversionWe startwith avideo税同盟的形成PllSuppose thereare threenations in the world,Nation landNation3areexporting nationswhile Nation2istheimporting nation.D andS representNation27s domesticdemand andsupply curvesofx xcommodityX.At thetariff-inclusive time,P】X=$2P3X=

1.5+1=

2.5before theformation ofthe customs union.Because2,52,so Nation2imports from Nation

1.Atprice2,Nation2consumes50X,with20X produceddomestically and30Ximported from Nationl.Nation2also collectstariff revenue,area c+e,whichimports timestariff rate.The firstsituation isthat Nation2forms a customs unionwith Nation3only.Without tariff,P3=

1.5,at thisprice Nation2will consumes60X,with15XXproduced domesticallyand40X importedfrom Nation

3.P12Now weturntothe tableto clearouttheprocess andmeasure thestaticeffect withconsumer surplusand producersurplus.As showninthefigure,we canconclude thechange ofimporting price代which declinesa erformation of customs union,domestic productionreducingbecause ofprice concession,domestic consumptionincreasingwith lower price andimporting quantityexpanding correspondingly.The importsincreased to45X.Now wedecompose the45X,we find30X isdivertingfromNation1to Nation3,5X iscoming fromdecrease ofdomestic production and10X fromincrease of domestic consumption.P13After theanalysis above,we getthe tradecreationandtrade diversion.30X representstrade diversioneffectofcustoms union.Trade diversionoccurswhen lower-cost importsfrom outsidethe customs union arereplacedby highercost importsfrom aunion member.This resultsbecauseof thepreferential tradetreatment givento membernations.Tradediversion,by itself,reduces welfarebecause itshifts productionfrom moreefficientproducers outsidethecustomsunion toless efficientproducersinside theunion.Thus,tradediversionworsens theinternational allocationofresources andshifts productionaway fromcomparative advantage.P14Trade creationcomes fromthe reductionof domesticproduction5Xand increaseofdomesticconsumption10X,representing byarea Aandarea Drespectively.Because withlowerprice,the moreefficient productionfromNation3replaces theless efficientdomesticproductionand consumersexpand theirconsumption.P15total effectsofcustomsunion areshown asfollow.To nation2,it isuncertaindepending onthe comparisonof improvementof tradecreationand deteriorationoftradediversion.To Nation1,it istotally badnew andwill establish its own tradebloc.To Nation3,it isa goodaction.P16Suppose anothersituation,that Nation2forms acustomsunionwithNation

1.What willhappenP17we willuse thesimilar tableto showthe influence.P18similar tothe formeranalysis,with Nation1,the priceis muchlower,imports expandlarger andthe totaleffect ispositive.P19To Nation1,it consolidatesand expandsits marketshare.To Nation3,it isstill outsideofthemarket andperhaps itwillestablishitsowntradebloc.P20The formationofacustomsunioncould increaseor reducethe welfareofmembernationsand oftherestoftheworld,depending onthecircumstances underwhich ittakes place.Choosing differenttrading partnerto formacustomsunion hasdifferentresult.It becomesa researchtopic.Whatever,acustomsunion benefitsconsumers andintroduces competitiontoproducers.P21This isan exampleofthetheoryofthe secondbest,which statesthat ifallthe conditionsrequired tomaximize welfareor reachPareto optimumcannotbe satisfied,trying tosatisfy asmany ofthese conditionsas possibledoesnot necessarilyor usuallylead tothe second-best position.Thus,forming acustomsunionand removingtrade barriersonlyamongthemembers willnot necessarilyproduce thesecond-best welfareposition.This somewhatstartling conclusionhas greatsignificance notonly forthefield ofinternational economicsbut forthe studyof economicsin general.P22Besides thestatic welfareeffects discussedearlier,thenationsforminga customsunionarelikely toreceive severalimportant dynamicbenefits.These aredue toincreased competition,economies ofscale,stimulus toinvestment,and betterutilization ofeconomic resources.P22After theanalysis,we findif theformation ordecomposition dependonnational interests•we cananswer whvUS quitTPP andTTIP,and UKquitfrom EU.。